The hypothesis I want to explore is that generalisation can be represented as an adjunction. More precisely, that generalisation and instantiation can be represented as an adjoint pair, generalisation being the left adjoint.
By “generalisation”, I mean learning concepts from examples, e.g. in machine learning. I believe that this applies to many different topics in machine learning, including statistical curve-fitting (and its implementation in various kinds of neural net), symbolic vector architectures, instance-based learning, and logical induction. If I’m right, this could be an important unification of these apparently unrelated topics.
Because I don’t have funding to do research, I’ve had no time to develop these ideas. So the best I can do so far is to justify the hypothesis by appealing to various intuitions, and to related mathematical and computational phenomena. I’ve put this material into nLab because I think it’s interesting, and may well be important to machine learning: the categorists and machine-learning experts I’ve asked agree. So perhaps other readers can supply technical substantiation or refutation. If I can ever get funding then of course I’ll do so as well. By the way, most of them have also said that even if this result is known to categorists, it isn’t known within machine learning, and that publicising it would therefore be useful.
These are similar to those that Joseph Goguen proposed for category theory in computing science in A Categorical Manifesto. If much concept learning can be represented by the same phenomenon, namely an adjunction, this should make it easier to compare learning algorithms and to translate algorithms from one branch of machine learning to another. Moreover, algorithms that can be represented as adjunctions may be better — if only because they’re easier to reason about — than those that can’t.
This is very speculative. But suppose that many kinds of generalisation can be formulated as adjunctions. Then what properties distinguish those adjunctions from others? If none, does this mean that all adjunctions can be regarded as generalisations? If so, does that tell us anything useful about adjunctions? Perhaps an information-theoretic way of thinking about them?
Let be a category of concepts, and be a category of sets of examples.
Let be a “generalisation” functor that maps each set of examples to its generalisation as a concept.
Conversely, let be a forgetful functor that maps each concept to some canonical set of examples.
Then my hypothesis is that and form an adjunction, being left adjoint to .
Suppose we have a set of sets of examples, and a set of concepts. Then we can define a function that maps each set of examples in to a concept in , by generalisation. Conversely, we can define a function that maps each concept in to a set of examples in .
I hope that we can then regard as finding what might be called the smallest generalisation, or most efficient representation, of its argument. Conversely, ought to “forget” whatever extra structure gained by becoming a concept, turning it back into a “canonical” set of examples. and may not be inverses, but they are, in some sense, the nearest one can get to inverses. I say what’s in this paragraph because (a) these are properties that I believe generalisation and forgetting should have; (b) adjoint functors often (always?) seem to work like this.
I haven’t said anything about what a concept is. One possibility, just to illustrate the idea, is the statistical regression line given by a least-squares fit. ’s objects would then be sets of 2-d points to be fitted, and C’s would be regression lines, probably equipped with goodness-of-fit information. This is a simple example; instances of other, more complicated, statistical models could also be concepts.
Some other possibilities for concepts are: high-dimensional vectors formed by superimposing vectors of property-value pairs in so-called “symbolic vector architectures” or “holographic reduced representations”; regions of classification space; logical propositions learnt by induction.
Here are some examples.
The examples are two-dimensional points (members of ). Generalisation is least-squares fitting, as above. The concept is a line giving the best least-squares fit to the points.
Generalisation is fitting of some other statistical model. The concept is an instance of that model.
The examples are logical sentences, classified as positive or negative. Generalisation is logical induction. The concept is a new sentence from which we can infer as many of the positive examples as possible (hopefully all) and as few of the negative examples (hopefully none) as possible.
The examples are pairs associating an element of the vector space with an element of the vector space . Generalisation is training a linear-associator neural net. The concept is a linear transformation which, if possible, maps all the to the , and if that’s not possible, does the best it can by finding an optimum transform which minimises interference between different associations.
The examples are pairs where is a point in and is a member of some set of symbolic labels. For instance, the might be elements of some space whose dimensions measure a voter’s preference for various policies; the could then be the possible parties, . Generalisation is nearest-neighbour prediction. The concept is a function which extends the set of pairs , mapping every point in to a label. It can therefore be used to predict the preferred party of other voters. I’ve taken this example from Truth from Trash by Chris Thornton.
The examples are the instances of generalisation given in this write-up. Generalisation is fitting each to a notion in category theory. The concept is a categorical construct…!
Although I introduced as a category of sets of examples, I’m sure there are other possibilities. An obvious one, though still set-related, is that the objects are weighted sets, where each weight tells the generaliser how important the corresponding example is. This probably ties up with fuzzy logic, fuzzy set theory, and stochastic logic programming. See also the following section.
These are taken from my short write-up Generalisation is an adjunction, recast into the naming convention I’m using here.
Let be the category whose objects are the atomic propositions , , , … and their conjunctions. Let there be an arrow from to if implies . This makes into a partial ordering defined by implication.
Let be the category whose objects are non-empty sets of the above atomic propositions. It has the obvious partial ordering by inclusion.
Let map each set of propositions in to their conjunction in ; let be its inverse. and reverse arrows, as in the next example.
The above is trivial, but I find it suggestive. Because it seems reasonable to say that forming the conjunction of a set of propositions as does is one (crude) way of generalising from them. Informally speaking, the conjunction contains just enough information to imply them all, but none of the others in the category (unless they were implied by the originals anyway). Now, we also know that in , their conjunction is their limit. (More correctly, it’s a limit of the diagram containing the propositions and the implication arrows between them.) But this formalises the notion expressed in the “just enough information” sentence, because of the universal mapping property of the limit. (That is, any other proposition which implies the originals also implies their conjunction.)
Let ’s objects be the non-empty sets of sentences where is an integer. So one object would be . Interpret as meaning “the integer is an example of the concept”. Interpret the arrows in as set inclusion.
Let be the category whose objects are sentences: either the atomic sentences or the universally-quantified sentence . (Unlike the category of sentences in the earlier example, this category does not contain conjunctions.) Interpret the arrows as implication.
Now define as follows. maps each singleton to the sentence . It maps sets with more than one element to the universally-quantified sentence. It also reverses arrows, mapping set inclusion to reverse implication.
We could say that implements a simple form of logical induction, rather more interesting than the earlier one. And there are two languages, that of restricted compared to that of , because cannot express conjunctions, and so has to approximate them by quantifying over all possible cases. The functor is “doing the best it can” in these circumstances.
Let ’s objects be the non-empty sets of colinear elements of . Once again, let the arrows be set inclusion.
Let be the category whose objects are either the singletons or infinite lines in . Let the arrows be set inclusion.
Then let map each singleton to itself, and map each set with more than one element to the line going through all ’s points. maps inclusions to inclusions. As with the previous instance, flattens most of into .
All the instances above can be formalised as adjunctions. Here’s a summary of the proof, via Galois connections:
The first point follows from the orderings I imposed on and . The second holds for , because it’s either an identity, as in the least-squares example, or equivalent to one, as in the conjunction and quantification examples. It holds also for , because it can’t “cross over”. If , then may equal , but it can’t be greater. The third point follows by simple calculation with these orders. The fourth is a standard result.
can be regarded as a functor which maps a set of examples to an object which is in some sense the “completion” of that set: the good old “free completion”. It acquires a right adjoint which maps this object back to the set of all possible examples derivable from this completion object.
I think of this in terms of the units and counits: an adjunction to is determined by the two functors and and by two natural transformations and . Given any object in , there is a morphism taking every to . Since maps to the set of all possible examples, and should map that back to the original generalisation, this is the identity. Hence we get one natural transformation.
In the other direction, given any object in , the functor will map it to the set of all possible examples of which is a part. There is an inclusion from to , and since this respects the other inclusions in , once again we get a natural transformation, .
(I need to relate this to the notion of limiting amount of information, showing how that arises from the adjunction.)
In the least-squares example, I stipulated that the sets of points in must be colinear. This isn’t very realistic: in real life, most sets of examples will not exactly fit a line.
In general, given any useful generalisation method, some sets of examples will not have an exact generalisation. You can say that this is due to experimental error, or to an inadequate statistical model, or to an insufficiently powerful description language, or to restricted storage capacity, or whatever. See also sections on “Change of language” below.
I thought of fixing this by extending so that it maps each set of non-colinear points to the line with the least least-squares distance from them. (But what if, in this or other examples, there is no unique best generalisation?)
The problem with this is that then no longer respects the arrows between the sets in . Originally, if was a subset of , then was a subset of . But this is no longer necessarily true: if the points in are colinear, and we make from by adding a point that isn’t on the line, then the best-fit line to will be different from that to , so the inclusion won’t hold.
Maybe the way to fix this is not to decide a priori that the morphisms in should be inclusions, but to let them be determined by the morphisms in . Philosophically speaking, perhaps this is reasonable — we don’t perceive the raw data directly, but always fit it to a preconceived model. But I feel I’m missing something else.
What’s the essence? A least-squares fit maps a set of points as follows. Some points fall exactly onto the regression line. Others, , don’t. In effect, it’s splitting the set into two parts, one of which needs added error information to describe it. Equivalently, it’s adding error information to every point, even though that’s 0 for some. Consider in the light of the FCA example vs. , and extension vs. intension. What property is common to all points on a regression line?
… I need fonts to distinguish between sets of examples and their elements…
That’s about as far as I’ve got; the examples I’ve so far constructed have the same structure as in 18, and seem to be missing something. I need to think about the structure of and , and probably get away from being only a subcategory of Set. One possibility which feels promising (thanks to Victor Winschel for encouraging me on this) is to see whether stochastic logic programming can be formulated in terms of adjoints.
(I need to complete this and the following examples.) In this, I’m leading up to generalisation in simple neural networks. Think of learning a linear transformation. is the category of sets of pairs . is the category of linear transformations between vector spaces and . puts pairs together to make a linear transformation. (What does do, and is it unique?) As with the least-squares example, this only works exactly if I restrict the sets in .
The idea is as in the previous example, but where sets of examples aren’t restricted to being expressible as linear transformations. In this case, generalisation has to “do the best it can”, modulo interference between learnt associations. Question: what should be? Ought it to be some kind of completion of above? See http://www.syndar.org/PAdams/The%20Linear%20Associator.pdf for how the associator works. will depend very tightly on how the associator is trained. I’ll start by considering how a single learning phase, in the terminology of the above reference, maps pairs to a matrix: the matrix in the notation of the reference’s Equations 1 onwards. (Also to be completed.)
Let be the category of real pairs . Let be the category of real pairs whose elements sum to 1. Let map to . Let be the identity. (Are and discrete?) (I’m working towards the way that induction in stochastic logic programming induces weights for the learnt clauses.)
I don’t know what to call this, but it feels relevant. It’s a picture that came to me. Imagine that is the category of subsets of . Now imagine that we have a real plane hatched by irregular intersecting lines, as if someone has been slashing a pencil across it again and again, or Jackson Pollock has been painting it. (I’m being intentionally vague.) Now let and also be the category of subsets of . Let distort each set of examples by moving each point in it to the nearest intersection of these lines. (Assume there is a unique intersection.) Then let find the smallest enclosing grid square as in my section “Galois connections and the idea of smallest enclosing concept” below. Let .
A little more generally, let be a category whose objects are either also subsets of , or something that’s easy to picture as derived, using elementary plane geometry, from these subsets. For example, their boundaries, or their centroids. Let translate each …..
Informally, the idea is that there’s a “background” which is not related to the examples, …..
Imagine various views of a physical object such as a leather armchair. A view of the top of the left arm; a view of the seat; and so on. Then we can merge these to make a composite view. If the views are sets, the merging can be described as a colimit in the category of sets.
By the way, I mention the leather armchair because Goguen used it as an example of merging views in a paper on sheaf semantics of concurrent interacting objects: Sheaf Semantics for Concurrent Interacting Objects.
Such a colimit automatically handles the situation where different views overlap and agree on their overlaps. In other words, it’s a way to reconstruct as much of the armchair as possible from partial views of it.
(The chart and atlas representation of manifolds is an example of this too E.g. page 38 of Category theory Lecture 6: Colimits, Jonathan Kirby. )
I should explain that colimit is a categorical construction. Set union is a special case of it. Goguen introduced the notion that colimits can model “putting together” components into a system. Many computer-science researchers use them to put together specifications or program modules into bigger specifications or modules.
But in real life, different views might disagree on their overlaps. In this case, we must find a way to combine these views with as little disagreement as possible. That also feels like a colimit.
This ties up with the idea that left adjoints can be regarded as finding the optimum, or most efficient, solution to a problem.
(This is an interpretation I came across in the Wikipedia entry for Adjoint functors (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adjoint_functors): possibly authored by the Wikipedian called “Functor salad”. We can regard the solution as being an initial object in a category of solutions. Its initiality models the fact that it contains the least disagreement about overlaps, or what I think of as the least “strain”, of any possible solution.)
In the above, I’ve been talking about reconstructing a single physical object from different, possibly incompatible, views of it: six blind men feel an elephant. I don’t know whether one should call such reconstruction “generalisation”. But I strongly suspect that there’s an analogy with the construction of a concept from examples of it, if we think of the examples as different views of the concept.
This may be related to the use of colimits for merging ontologies, and for sensor fusion.
I’ll note that this also feels relevant to the topic of “categorical perception” introduced by cognitive scientist Stevan Harnad, and to similar methods of learning classifications. Neural network modeling of categorical perception, by R.I. Damper and S.R. Harnad ; Categorical Perception, by S.R. Harnad. This is something I need to think about further: for the moment, I’ll just quote from Harnad’s abstract to the second paper:
Differences can be perceived as gradual and quantitative, as with different shades of gray, or they can be perceived as more abrupt and qualitative, as with different colors. The first is called continuous perception and the second categorical perception. Categorical perception (CP) can be inborn or can be induced by learning. Formerly thought to be peculiar to speech and color perception, CP turns out to be far more general, and may be related to how the neural networks in our brains detect the features that allow us to sort the things in the world into their proper categories, "warping" perceived similarities and differences so as to compress some things into the same perception and the second categorical perception. Categorical perception (CP) can be inborn or can be induced by learning. Formerly thought to be peculiar to speech and color perception, CP turns out to be far more general, and may be related to how the neural networks in our brains detect the features that allow us to sort the things in the world into their proper categories, "warping" perceived similarities and differences so as to compress some things into the same category and separate others into different categories.
(The “categorical” here is not connected with category theory but with categorisation.)
Goguen’s leather-armchair example actually applies not just to views of the shape itself, but to views of attributes defined on it: e.g. colour, temperature. This is how he introduces his sheaf semantics of concurrent interacting objects, in which he represents objects as sheaves of local observations, these being mappings from a base space (e.g. the surface of the chair) to attributes. Perhaps there is a way to represent concepts as sheaves of properties of examples, or something related.
Another idea that I want to capture is that of least general generalisation. This phrase is used in inductive logic programming, and was introduced by Gordon Plotkin to describe anti-unification (_A note on inductive generalization_. In B. Meltzer and D. Michie, editors, “Machine Intelligence”, volume 5, 1970). But I want to think of it more generally. For instance, if we have a poset of concepts, the least general generalisation of two concepts and is a new concept which implies as much as possible about and , but as little as possible about anything else. It contains the information we need to reconstruct the examples, but as little else as possible.
Similarly, in a category of logical propositions, the product of two propositions (their conjunction) implies each one, but nothing else. It contains the information we need to reconstruct the examples, but nothing else. This property too is something that I believe a generalisation should have.
This leads me to the intuition that generalisation can be represented as a limit.
But, contrary to the previous three paragraphs, the language we normally use to describe concepts is different from that used to describe examples. For example, in statistical least-squares regression, the concept is a line plus error information, but the examples are points.
Moreover, we usually want the concept to be compressed or otherwise different from just being a conjunction or something analogous. I suppose there are various reasons for this:
This difference between the language of examples and the language of concepts is why I have two categories, and . And it’s also why I want to model generalisation as an adjunction, rather than as only a limit or colimit.
This may be related to the fact that in categorical logic, universal quantification can be represented as an adjunction. (See the section on “Lawvere quantifiers: Quantification as adjunction” in quantifier). Can one regard that as a kind of generalisation?
Now that I’ve introduced the change of language, a very important point is that the generalisation functor from examples to concepts, and the forgetful functor from concepts to examples, may not be able to translate exactly. In particular, the language of concepts may not be able to summarise every set of examples exactly. For example, a linear regression line can’t represent non-colinear points exactly. A categorisation of animals into a class of animals that resemble sparrows and blackbirds, and another class of animals that resemble dogs, cats, and horses, will struggle to place duck-billed platypuses.
In such cases, I think of the adjunction as “doing the best it can” to create concepts, or to reconstruct examples from concepts. I think intuitively of mapping from examples to concepts as creating a kind of “strain”. Imagine the sets of examples as points on a plane, and generalisation as trying to enclose each set with a springy piece of metal like an artist’s flexicurve. The flexicurve can’t bend sharply, so the “flexicurve concept language” makes the set boundaries smoother and wider than they should be. (Is this intuition worth formalising?)
This is related to an explanation of adjunction in terms of Galois connections, from a chapter in “The Logical foundations of cognition” edited by John Macnamara and Gonzalo E. Reyes (once accessible on Google Books, but they’ve blocked access). The authors describe a category whose objects are sets in , and a subcategory of constructed as follows. Draw a grid on of cells of side 1. Then ’s objects are shapes made by combining these grid cells: in other words, unions of squares of side 1. Let map each set to the smallest union of squares enclosing it, and map each union of squares to itself. Then and form a Galois connection. That’s well known, but it’s a nice explanation, and perhaps a good “intuition pump” for concepts and examples. It makes me think of generalisation as finding the “smallest enclosing concept” for a set of examples.
Jeremy Gibbons reminded me that Galois connections are used in Formal Concept Analysis? to map between the intension (set of characterising attributes) and the extension (set of examples) of a concept. See e.g. http://www.alpheccar.org/fr/posts/show/32 (URL not currently accessible). Jeremy felt that this is morally the same as my machine learning scenario — inferring a concept from a set of examples and/or a set of properties.
My idea probably also related to Lawvere’s comment about an adjunction between syntax and semantics, explained in Peter Smith’s article The Galois connection between syntax and semantics. As Patterns in Functional Programming’s posting Universal properties and Galois connections puts it:
This construction can be used to translate a problem about the extension of a concept (that is, an enumeration of its instances) into one about the intension (that is, the characteristic properties of its instances). It is related to the observation that “syntax and semantics are adjoint“—under the analogy that “objects” are sets of mathematical structures, “properties” are axioms, and the relation is “satisfaction”, the models of an axiomatic theory $T$ are included in a set of structures $S$ if and only if the theory $T$ logically entails the minimal axiomatization of $S$.
Thanks to Jeremy and to Viktor Winschel for pointing this out.
Hendrik Hilberdink asked whether my generalisation adjunction is related to the adjunction between minimal realization and behaviour of an automaton. This is worth looking into. Perhaps the structure of those categories will give some clues about that of my categories of concepts and examples.