

Modal Homotopy Type Theory

David Corfield

University of Kent

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However, HoTT/UF is a particularly interesting system.

HoTT

- Another foundation for mathematics, which describes a different ‘shape’ natively – rather than a set, a ‘homotopy type’.
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- HoTT is an intrinsically structuralist language, suited to reasoning up to equivalence. The ‘homotopification’ of mathematics.
- Modal variants are interesting too. They allow a great deal of theory to be expressed synthetically.

Peeling back the layers

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is

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My book explores these components in conceptual terms. Other sources are available (e.g., the 'HoTT Book') for a formal treatment.

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A type may be viewed as a set of clothes (or a suit of armor) that protects an underlying untyped representation from arbitrary or unintended use. It provides a protective covering that hides the underlying representation and constrains the way objects may interact with other objects. In an untyped system untyped objects are naked in that the underlying representation is exposed for all to see. (Cardelli, L., Wegner, P., On Understanding Types, Data Abstraction, and Polymorphism, 1985, p. 474)

Philosophical interest

Surprisingly little work has been done on type theory meets analytic philosophy of language/metaphysics.

...we are in the dark about the nature of philosophical problems and methods if we are in the dark about types and categories.
(Ryle, "Categories", 1938)

(For some further thoughts, my last few blog posts:
<https://golem.ph.utexas.edu/category/david.html>)

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Questions concerning the value of ill-formed terms/types "do not arise" (Collingwood, Strawson).

Dependent types

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This allows for the natural treatment of the common situation of a function $f : B \rightarrow A$, where we consider the inverse images of each $a : A$.

Assigning players to their team, for $t : \text{Team}$, $\text{Player}(t)$ collects players of the same team.

Why dependent types?

Let k be a field, V a finite-dimensional vector space over k , and f an endomorphism of V . Then define $E(V, k, f)$, the eventual image of f , as the vector space which is the intersection of all $f^n(V)$. Show $f(E) = E$.

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- $x : A, y : B, z : C, P(x), Q(y, z), R \vdash S(x, y, z)$

Note that we typically don't mention elements of propositions, but take the presence of these propositions to indicate that they hold.

Now in *untyped* (untyped) FOL, we only allow one non-dependent type, and then omit to mention it.

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The domain remains implicit, and all variables range over it.

The form of a logic gives rise to a metaphysical perspective.

Untyped FOL suggests that objects belong to a domain of 'everything', and that then there are properties corresponding to subclasses of the domain.

There's a clear distinction between object and property.

Type formation

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Type formation is specified by rules saying when we can introduce a type, how to construct terms of that type, how to use or “eliminate” terms of that type, and how to compute when we combine the constructors with the eliminators.

	<u>type theory</u>	<u>category theory</u>
	<u>syntax</u>	<u>semantics</u>
	<u>natural deduction</u>	<u>universal construction</u>
	<u>product type</u>	<u>product</u>
<u>type formation</u>	$\frac{\vdash A:\text{Type} \quad \vdash B:\text{Type}}{\vdash A \times B:\text{Type}}$	$A, B \in \mathcal{C} \Rightarrow A \times B \in \mathcal{C}$
<u>term introduction</u>	$\frac{\vdash a:A \quad \vdash b:B}{\vdash (a,b):A \times B}$	$ \begin{array}{ccccc} & & Q & & \\ & a \swarrow & & \searrow & b \\ & A & & A \times B & B \\ & & & \downarrow (a,b) & \\ & & & & \end{array} $
<u>term elimination</u>	$\frac{\vdash t:A \times B}{\vdash p_1(t):A} \quad \frac{\vdash t:A \times B}{\vdash p_2(t):B}$	$ \begin{array}{ccccc} & & Q & & \\ & & \downarrow t & & \\ A & \xleftarrow{p_1} & A \times B & \xrightarrow{p_2} & B \end{array} $
<u>computation rule</u>	$p_1(a, b) = a \quad p_2(a, b) = b$	$ \begin{array}{ccccc} & & Q & & \\ & a \swarrow & & \searrow & b \\ & A & & A \times B & B \\ & \xleftarrow{p_1} & & \xrightarrow{p_2} & \\ & & & \downarrow (a,b) & \end{array} $

It's important to understand how type formation expresses universal properties via adjunctions. (Cf. 'Categorical Harmony and Path Induction' Patrick Walsh)

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We should identify logic with a “scheme of interlocking adjoints” (Lawvere 1973, p. 142)

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Pairing with a predicate gives 'An author who is ...'

- $y : Author, z : British(y)$,
- $(y, z) : \sum_{x:Author} British(x)$

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In the case of a proposition:

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Anaphoric pronouns

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- $x : Person, y : Child(x), z : Dishonour(x, y) \vdash p : Punish(x, y, z)$

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We also have a hierarchy of universes of types, $Type_i$.

Univalent universes are such that the types $Id_{Type}(A, B)$ and $Equiv(A, B)$ are equivalent.

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We also allow the formation of HITs (e.g., the type of natural numbers, quotients of sets by relations, the circle, etc.), and we have HoTT.

FOL as a restricted type theory

Type-formation in the restricted FOL setting:

- 0 appears as the proposition False.
- \times appears as conjunction.
- \sum appears as existential quantification.
- \prod appears as universal quantification.
- Function types of propositions correspond to implication.
- Elements of function types in $[domain^n, domain]$ are n -ary functions.
- The identity type appears as equality on the domain.

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It can be made classical.

Of course, just as with FOL we may define FOL-theories by specifying predicates, constants, functions, and axioms, so with HoTT we may provide HoTT-theories by specifying generating types, terms, and axioms.

'*Type theory*' is very ambiguous.

Little has been said about applying it.

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From the perspective of proposition-as-some-types, this is no more philosophically puzzling than applied logic.

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The choice of FOL + ZFC shapes the Anglophone philosophical terrain. We need to explore type theory in the philosophy of language and metaphysics.

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- Philosophy: metaphysics – possible worlds, temporal logic, epistemic logic.
- Linguistics: pragmatics

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One natural example to consider is the adjoint triple corresponding to dependent sum and dependent product.

- $w : World \vdash A(w) : Prop$
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- $w : World \vdash A(w) : Prop$
- $\prod_{w:World} A(w), \sum_{w:World} A(w)$
- ‘For all worlds, A ’.
- ‘The worlds where A ’, truncated to ‘In some world, A ’.

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We can also choose a group for W .

More generally, we could use any $f : W \rightarrow V, R : S \rightrightarrows T$.

The approach of Licata, Shulman and Riley to modal dependent type theory is promising.

Synthetic Mathematics in Modal Dependent Type Theories. 6-talk tutorial joint with Felix Wellen. Hausdorff Institute Workshop on Types, Homotopy Type theory, and Verification, 2018.

(Dan Licata's site, <https://dlicata.wescreates.wesleyan.edu/pubs.html>)

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The amount of gauge QFT notions naturally formalized here in cohesive homotopy type theory seems to be remarkable, emphasizing the value of a formal, logical, approach to concepts like smoothness and cohomology. (Urs Schreiber, Michael Shulman, Quantum Gauge Field Theory in Cohesive Homotopy Type Theory, arXiv:1408.0054)

To conclude

We're in an exploratory phase. Modal HoTT is *disruptive technology*.

- Our understanding of the world as typed.
- A synthetic theory of structures.
- The untapped world of modal type theory.